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INFORMATION CASCADES AND
MASS MEDIA LAW
STEVEN GEOFFREY GIESELER*
INTRODUCTION
"What qualifies as news?" This question has vexed editors
and bureau chiefs for the duration of the American free press
experiment. But while the query has remained constant through
time, the rhetorical and practical responses it has elicited have been
remarkably fluid. Indeed, while the extra-marital dalliances of
President Kennedy remained a press-held secret considered taboo
for broadcast or publication in the 1960s, the media firestorm that
surrounded similar indiscretions helped lead to the impeachment of
another president less than forty years later.' This anecdotal
illustration demonstrates the quandary faced by those who
undertake the mass dissemination of opinion and happenings-
while it might be the express goal of some to relate "All the News
That's Fit to Print," determining what is "fit" involves a constantly
changing assessment framework.
The question of what is and isn't news implicates a complex
and sometimes paradoxical relationship between news media and
news consumer. It is of course true that media outlets are market
actors whose profits are based on circulation or viewership and the
advertising rates based on these statistics. As such, it is incumbent
upon the collective media to disseminate the information that will
* Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation; Juris Doctor, University of
Virginia School of Law, 2004.
1. While any study of the "Biggest News Stories" of the 1990s will of
course be inexact-other than one that simply measures the number of
mentions in major media outlets-perhaps only the O.J. Simpson murder trial
approached the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal and subsequent impeachment in
terms of news primacy for the decade.
2. The famed motto of The New York Times.
best attract business in the form of interested consumers. At the
same time, however, the power of media to set a given agenda is
evident throughout American history, from Hearst's involvement in
the Spanish-American War to Harriet Beecher Stowe's indictment
of slavery and Paine's pamphlet that predates the founding of the
Republic. Thus emerges a cyclical interaction between media and
those who consume it: media actors must react and respond to the
demands of the public, unless they decide that they might dictate
what the public wants before it knows it wants it. Regardless of the
genesis of the interest, the more media focus upon a given incident
or subject, the more the public becomes interested in it, leading to
more coverage and then to more interest. So continues the circle.
This relational process between disseminator and consumer
has been studied at some length by social scientists. The term
"information cascade" was coined to describe the "self-reinforcing
process of collective belief formation by which an expressed
perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception...
increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public
discourse. ' In other words, "X must be true because everybody
says X is true.",4 While such information cascades can at times take
on lives of their own, the phenomenon has been harnessed, most
notably by political operatives. Candidates for office conduct polls
they know will yield favorable results and then release those results
to the media, who report on it and (in theory) continue to reinforce
the idea of positive perception of the candidate by the public-at-
large. This snowball effect can continue to reinforce itself to the
point that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 5 At the axis of this
cascade are mass media, which serve as both input devices and
output mechanisms with respect to a given story or perception.
As endemic as the idea of information cascades may be to
3. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availabilitv Cascade, and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999).
4. See Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Regarding the Tort Reform Movement
and Its Impact on Environmental Enforcement, (unpublished manuscript at
25-26, on file with author) (describing the intentional manipulation of
information cascades by interest groups in the context of the debate over tort
reform).
5. Id. (manuscript at 24). A specific political example-that of John
Kerry and the perception of "electability" -will be examined in Part II in/i'a.
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the study of politics and belief formation, it has tangible
implications in other fields as well. Not the least of these is the law
governing mass media, particularly the legal regimes that control
defamation suits and claims arising from the publication of private
facts. These causes of action have, as a component, the question of
whether the published information is of public interest, and this
component can be dispositive with respect to judgment and
available damages.
This Article will examine the phenomenon of information
cascades in the context of mass media law's definition of "matters
of public concern" and analogous concepts.C In doing so, particular
attention will be paid to the ways in which the cyclical nature of
information cascades can elevate a presumably private matter to
the level of "newsworthy." Part I will chronicle constitutional,
statutory, and common law formulations of "matter of public
concern," looking not only at the prevailing case law but also at the
theoretical and public policy rationales underlying the current
doctrine. Part II will discuss information cascades, outlining the
phenomenon by examining sociological literature and anecdotal
illustrations. Part III will conclude by examining the impact of
cascades on mass media jurisprudence, detailing the manner in
which definitions of "matters of public concern" can be influenced
by information cascades and media's role in their promulgation. In
short, this Article will look at the extent to which a matter is legally
deemed a "matter of public concern" solely because it is in or on
the news, and the legal implications thereof.
6. The term representing the central theme of this article- "matter of
public concern" -is enclosed in quotation marks to emphasize that it is a term
of art, not a concretely or coherently defined concept. Analogous terminology
in privacy actions will be treated similarly unless otherwise noted. To wit,
concepts of "newsworthiness" and "matters of public interest" will be treated
in identical fashion to the idea of "matters of public concern" unless a
distinction is warranted.
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1. "MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN" AND MASS MEDIA LAW
A. Development of the Current Regime
1. Doctrinal Antecedents
The modern formulation of "matters of public concern" in
mass media jurisprudence was foreshadowed by two Supreme
Court opinions in cases involving employment disputes. The first of
these, Thornhill v. Alabama, was a 1940 case dealing with the
constitutional right of laborers to picket their employers. In
holding for the picketers, the Court drew a baseline beyond which
speech could not be restricted without running afoul of the First
Amendment, stating that "[t]he freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."' Thereby,
the Court made two notable choices: First, it introduced the term
"4matter[s] of public concern" into the legal lexicon. Second, and
more importantly, it did so without offering any guidance
whatsoever as to how that term should be defined.
Another historical antecedent to the current mass media
law regime, the decision in Connick v. Myers, , clearly anticipated
the categorization of speech relating to "public concern" that has
since become doctrine." Connick dealt with the extent to which a
State agency was justified in terminating a worker in retaliation for
her causing a "mini-insurrection" via speech critical of
management." The discharged worker claimed that her
7. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8. Id. at 101-02 (emphasis added). See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 675 (1990)
(discussing Thornhill and its application to Hustler Magazine v. Faiwell).
9. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
10. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (discussed at some length immediately infra).
11. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. For further discussion in the context of the
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termination amounted to state restriction on free speech and was
therefore a violation of the First Amendment.'2 Overturning the
district court and the affirmation of the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court found no such infringement." The Connick Court, like the
Court in Thornhill forty-two years earlier, drew a clear distinction
between speech concerning private matters and speech regarding a
'matter of public concern.' In reaching a holding opposite from that
of its 1940 predecessor, Connick placed the worker's criticisms
squarely within the private sphere, affording her speech none of the
privileged protection of its public counterpart. 4 In contrasting the
two categories the Court deemed "speech concerning public
affairs ... the essence of self-government" and placed such speech
upon "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values.'1 5 Despite these lofty accolades, the Court did not offer
anything approximating a definition of 'public concern.'
2. Defamation Law and "Matters of Public Interest"
The jurisprudential lineage of the modern defamation
regime starts with the Supreme Court's landmark opinion in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan." This case was born out of an
advertisement, published by the New York Times in f960, which
alleged abuses of power by Alabama police officers in response to
nonviolent civil rights protests.' A Montgomery city official, L.B.
Sullivan, claimed that the charges made in the ad were false, and
that as the supervisor of the police department against which the
charges were levied, the ad defamed him.' Sullivan brought suit
and won a judgment for $500,000, which was upheld by the
"public concern test," see Cynthia Estlund. Speech on Matters of Public
Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment C'ategory, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
12. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 145.
15. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. [d. at 256-57.
18. [d. at 256.
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Alabama Supreme Court and appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court." In one of the more famous decisions of the twentieth
century, the Court reversed the Alabama court, holding that even
though some of the ad's allegations were indeed false, a public
official could only recover damages for statements related to his
official conduct upon proof that the defendant acted with "actual
malice"; that is, that the alleged defamer's statement was made
,with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. _
2
1
The distinction made in New York Times between public
officials and private plaintiffs has significant implications for the
definition of "matters of public interest." Echoing the elevation of
public and political speech elucidated in Thornhill and Connick, the
Court explicitly imported the idea that certain content-based
categories of speech deserve heightened constitutional protection
into the realm of defamation law. Borrowing Justice Brandeis's
praise of speech on public matters in Whitney v. California,12 the
opinion in New York Times had the precedential effect of
distinguishing, for First Amendment purposes, speech that concerns
the public and speech that does not. While the explicit mandate of
New York Times and its progeny was to require a showing of
actual malice in order to sustain a defamation action by a public
official, the practical effect was to introduce into defamation law
the idea that speech on public matters -particularly ones of
political significance -should be the most unfettered of all
categories of speech.3 Yet once again, the Court displayed
19. Id. at 254.
20. Jd. at 280.
21. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). "Those who won our independence believed ...
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government." Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22. See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (holding that a
public works supervisor was a public official for defamation purposes); see also
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (unanimously holding that a
candidate for office is a public official and must show actual malice to recover
in defamation).
23. The distinction drawn between "matters of public concern" and other
categories of media expression has garnered a considerable deal of criticism
from the academy. These critiques will be dealt with at some depth in Part I
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unwillingness or inability to define or even describe what
constituted such valued speech, an omission with ramifications as
lasting as those of the Court's explicit holding.
The heightened protection for speech regarding public
officials guaranteed by New York Times was girded by the
assumption that such speech must necessarily concern the public. It
was inevitable, however, that a case would arise combining a
private plaintiff with speech that was arguably "of public concern."
For while New York Times embodied the sentiment that most (if
not all) speech regarding a public official concerned the public,24 it
did not logically follow that the only "matters of public concern"
were those surrounding such officials. Some speech pertaining to a
private plaintiff could indeed be found to concern the public. This
inevitability was first acknowledged in 1971 in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, where a plurality of the Court held that a private
plaintiff should be denied recovery where the allegedly defamatory
speech (in this instance, a television news report) concerned a
matter of public interest.
In Rosenbloom, two Justices reasoned that the actual malice
standard of New York Times should apply to all 'matters of public
or general concern' regardless of the plaintiff's status. 6 Justice
Black went further by advocating absolute immunity for speech on
such matters. Though Justice White's concurrence implicitly
applied the standard to "official actions of public servants", -thus
for the first time offering some kind of guidance as to what
qualified as a "matter of public concern"-such a definition was
only alluded to and largely ignored. The fractured nature of the
opinion required a more solid resolution, the opportunity for which
was offered three years later in Gertz v. Welch.")
(B) infra.
24. See Monitor Patriot, 401 U.S. at 273 ("anything which might touch on
an official's fitness for office" is afforded the heightened protection of the
actual malice standard); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)
(echoing the New York 7imes holding).
25. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
26. Jd. at 31-32.
27. Jd. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
28. Jd. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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While Gertz is a famous and precedent-setting opinion, it
includes contradictions remarkably relevant to the examination at
hand. The Gertz Court held that where a media actor putatively
defames a private individual by reporting on a "matter of public
concern," states should be given the authority to fashion and
enforce legal remedies of their own choosing (to the exclusion of a
strict liability regime). Citing the greater access to channels of
rebuttal ("self-help") available to public figures as compared to
private individuals, the Court rejected extension of the New York
Times standard to private plaintiffs.3' Among the potential risks of
such an extension, according to Justice Powell, would be the
"difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc
basis which publications address issues of 'general or public
interest' and which do not." 2
The seminal case decided in the wake of Gertz revealed that
Justice Powell's warning against ad hoc determinations of "general
or public interest" had not been heeded. In that case, Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, the holding and the rule it
promulgated necessitate just that kind of ad hoc determination.
Refining Gertz, the Court in Dun & Bradstreet held that where a
private plaintiff is defamed via "speech on matters of purely private
concern," states should have the latitude to award punitive and
presumed damages even in the absence of a showing of actual
malice.1 This standard necessarily requires just the type of case-by-
case public/private distinction warned against in Gertz. This
problem was not lost on the four dissenting Justices in Dun &
Bradstreet, who explicitly confronted the malleability of such
determinations of "matters of public concern":
Without explaining what is a "matter of public
concern," the plurality opinion proceeds to
30. Id. at 345-46. The holding essentially refuted the reasoning
articulated in Rosenbloom, in that it declined to extend the New York Times
standard to private plaintiffs.
31. Id. at 344-45.
32. Id. at 346.
33. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
34. [d. at 759.
35. Id. at 761.
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serve up a smorgasbord of reasons why the
speech at issue here is not, and on this basis
affirms the [lower] courts' award of presumed
and punitive damages.
... Even accepting the notion that a distinction
can and should be drawn between matters of
public concern and matters of purely private
concern, however, the analyses presented [in
the opinion and Justice White's concurrence]
fail on their own terms. Both, by virtue of what
they hold in this case, propose an impoverished
definition of "matters of public concern" that is
irreconcilable with First Amendment
principles!'
The "definition" offered by the plurality and criticized in
Justice Brennan's dissent is in reality nothing more than a specific
justification for finding that the speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet
(a credit report) was not a "matter of public concern." In
determining that the credit report was outside the ambit of "public
concern," the plurality noted that the report was "solely in the
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience," and that there was "no credible argument that this type
of credit reporting requires special protection to ensure that 'debate
on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
The plurality's "smorgasbord" of generalities may have been
adequate to explain the narrow holding with respect to credit
reports, but it offers very little in the way of a solid framework for
the vast majority of cases involving the "public concern" doctrine.
Thus, the two most distinguishing features of the Dun &
Bradstreet opinion-its narrowness and its vagueness-render it
essentially useless as future guidance. In this regard, it serves as a
36. Id. at 785-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See MARC FRANKLIN, ET AL..
MASS MEDIA LAw 357 (6th ed. 2000) (noting that the dissenters in Dun &
Bradstreet viewed the standard applied by the majority as "irreconcilable with
First Amendment principles").
37. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
38. Jd. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 270
(1964)).
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sort of legal "unfunded mandate" to which courts are forced to
adhere but are given no direction on how to do so. The most
generally applicable formulation of "public concern" offered by the
plurality was that whether "speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by [its] content, form, and context...
as revealed by the whole record."' 3 This test is so broad so as to be
meaningless, requiring future courts to engage in just the kind of
standard-less determination Gertz sought to avoid. The only clear
contours of "public concern" are that speech directly related to the
political realm is always a "matter of public concern," and that
anything else requires an ad hoc assessment.
3. Privacy Actions and "Newsworthiness"
As integral as "matters of public concern" are in the
defamation regime, comparable concepts are even more central in
tort actions for public disclosure of private facts.4' Under the
moniker of "newsworthiness," the concept of information that
warrants public interest is prominent enough in the field to be
deemed the "linchpin" of the cause of action.4' The centrality of
"newsworthiness" to the privacy torts is conceptually related to the
heightened protection of speech on "matters of public concern" in
defamation law. Because the First Amendment requires that
speech dealing with public officials be given a wide protective
berth actions for public disclosure of private facts usually involve
plaintiffs who are not public officials. A private plaintiff seeking
39. Id. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147-48 (1983)).
40. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 35-36.
41. A basic formulation of this cause of action is:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern
to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
42. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 186 (2004).
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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redress for disclosure of putatively private facts has, as his chief bar
to recovery, the burden of showing that the facts at issue were not
"newsworthy., 44  This assignment of the burden of proof is
significant; it reveals that despite concern about private individuals
being thrust into the public light against their wills, the law is still
unwilling to place a de facto prior restraint upon such speech by
presuming it illegal.
More attention has been paid to fashioning a workable
definition of "newsworthiness" for the privacy torts than to defining
,.matters of public concern" for purposes of defamation law. The
definition of "newsworthiness" is not absolute and is necessarily
devised and applied on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless, because
privacy actions tend to involve plaintiffs who are not obviously
public figures, courts are under increased pressure to delineate the
concept. The result is not an absolute, Supreme Court-authored
definition of the concept, but rather a collection of lower court
holdings that address the issue to varying degrees.
Perhaps the case that offers the most guidance with respect
to "newsworthiness" in actions for public disclosure of private facts
is Diaz v. Oakland Tribune,4 5 decided by the California Court of
Appeals in 1983. The court held that a newspaper column
revealing a local student council leader as a transsexual was not
"news" and thus could give rise to liability in an action for public
disclosure. The court offered various factors for assessing
"newsworthiness." At different points in the opinion, the court
maintains that "newsworthiness" is contingent upon "contemporary
community mores and standards of decency;",41 whether a given
private fact "warrant[s] ... public inspection;"' and finally, a three-
part test (adopted from a California Supreme Court holding)
weighing ..[1] the social value of the facts published, [2] the depth
of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and [3] the
extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety.,
4 1
44. 62A AM. JtuR. 2D Privacy § 186 (2004).
45. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 9 Media L. Rep. 1121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
46. Jd. at 772.
47. Jd. at 762.
48. Jd. at 772 (alteration in original) (quoting Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
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If the courts in noteworthy defamation cases might be
chastened for not offering enough guidance, the court in Diaz
might be conversely guilty of offering so much that none of it is
functional. To have "newsworthiness" comprised of so many
different components in fact paralyzes any effort to fashion a
comprehensible definition. Still, the formulation in Diaz is notable
for two main reasons. First, by making community mores central to
a determination of "newsworthiness," Diaz anticipates the theory
that "newsworthiness" ceases where the dissemination of private
facts serves no purpose other than an appeal to morbid curiosity or
mere sensationalism.4 This concept has taken root in privacy
actions across the United States, echoed nearly verbatim by Chief
Judge Posner in his opinion in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf in 1993."
Indeed, this idea has cemented itself to the extent that it serves as
the basis for both elements of the claim: that the disclosure (1)
would prove highly offensive to reasonable sensibilities and (2) is
not of legitimate public concern.5'
Diaz's second notable feature is its institutionalization of
the three-prong test recounted above . This test for
"newsworthiness," while not the last word in the field, does
compliment the "contemporary mores" ideal by setting an outer
boundary for what kind of speech is to be afforded the highest
degree of First Amendment protection. Adopted by a number of
courts in California and elsewhere, the ordering of the elements in
the test is neither random nor insignificant. The first prong of the
Assoc., 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971)).
49. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 187 (2004).
50. 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1.993) ("An individual, and more
pertinently perhaps the community. is most offended by the publication of
intimate personal facts when the community has no interest in them beyond
the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a
stranger.").
51. Id., FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 424.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. 62A Am. JUR. 2D Privacy § 187 (2004) (citing the following cases as
adopting the test: Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980); Kapellas v.
Koffman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-
American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982)). See Honig v. Nashville Banner
Pub. Co., 10 Med. L. Rptr. 2139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
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test determines the "social value" of the published facts. In
accordance with the Supreme Court's concern about chilling speech
on issues important to the public, this prong is paramount. When
"social value" is found, the second and third prongs of the test
("depth of intrusion" and "accession to public notoriety") are
almost always subsumed. 54 Thus, an interesting yet disheartening
paradox emerges: although the law of public disclosure appears to
provide more guidance in defining "newsworthiness," the analysis
may in essence be nothing more than the vague "matters of public
concern" test used in defamation cases.
The most workable guidance pertaining to
"newsworthiness" and "matters of public concern" is found in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate
public interest, account must be taken of the
customs and conventions of the community;
and in the last analysis what is proper becomes
a matter of the community mores. The line is
to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with
decent standards, would say that he had no
55
concern.
This description clearly tracks the formulation of
"newsworthiness" in Diaz. The Restatement breaks new ground,
however, and implicates the role of the media as standard-setters, in
the following Comment: "Included within the scope of legitimate
public concern are matters of the kind customarily regarded as
'news.' To a considerable extent, in accordance with the mores of
the community, the publishers and broadcasters have themselves
54. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977). See also
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122. 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing and
applying a tentative draft of what would later be adopted as section 652D of
the Restatement (Second)).
2005] INFORMATION CASCADES
defined the term, as a glance at any morning paper will confirm."
In essence, the Restatement endorses a standard for
defining "matters of public concern" in which something is
,,newsworthy" by virtue of it being in the news. The Restatement
approach highlights the potential impact of information cascades on
the determination that a given issue "newsworthy" or a "matter of
public concern." While those implications will be dealt with at
considerable length infra, the impact can now be distilled to the
general idea that the standards of those who disseminate the news
greatly influence what is legally determined "newsworthy." Thus,
while the Restatement and the courts that follow it employ a more
coherent paradigm of "public concern" than the existing common
law of defamation or privacy, it is one that, in a sense, allows the
inmates to run the jail.
As is often the case with the various Restatements, this
concept has been integrated into the common law. New York
courts, for example, implemented this definition of
"newsworthiness," which is not surprising due to the numbers and
influence of the publishers within that jurisdiction. New York law
makes clear that what the media decide is a "matter of public
concern" will be given the presumption of validity that can be
overcome only by a showing of "gross irresponsibility" and a lack of
"due consideration for [the] standards" that govern professional
• 57
journalism.
B. A Theoretical Critique of the Current Regime
It would be challenging to find comprehensive praise of the
contemporary "public concern" doctrine within the legal academy
or profession. Indeed, even the judges and justices who have
authored the opinions that collectively comprise the common law
regime appear to do so reluctantly, as evidenced by the fractured
and sometimes contentious nature of the decisions and dissents that
populate the field. Practitioners too may find the relative chaos in
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977).
57. [d.; Huggins v. Moore, 726 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1999); Gaeta v. New
York News, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1984).
58. Judicial ambivalence about defamation law and the First
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this area a mixed blessing: the lack of consistent guidelines allows
for great latitude in the pursuit of various objectives, but also makes
projections of success exceedingly difficult.
At the risk of oversimplification, criticism of the doctrines
relating to "matters of public concern" and "newsworthiness" in
mass media law tends to fall into one of two categories. The first
type of criticism rejects the very existence of such content-based
categories of protected speech. The second major criticism-not in
any sense exclusive of the first, but rather a reflection of the
practical realization that such categorical protection is not likely to
evaporate any time soon-argues that if such tests for "public
concern" and "newsworthiness" must exist, they should exist in
more defined and practically applicable incarnations. Criticism of
the current prevailing regime, and even the judicial opinions that
support and further it, recognize that the doctrine in question is so
vague and inconsistent that it is virtually unworkable. Grappling
with "matters of public concern" and "newsworthiness" is all the
more difficult because of the essential and honored First
Amendment concerns implicated.
1. The Dangers of "Defining-In" Matters of Public Concern
For all of the fissures in the collective dialogue over the
"public concern" doctrine, one consensus can be gleaned: if there is
to be a value-system ranking of different content-based categories
of speech, then political speech should be at the top of the list. This
Amendment occurs even at the highest level. In his concurrence in Dun &
Bradstreet, Justice White recalled:
I joined the judgment and opinion in New York Times.
I also joined later decisions extending the New York
Times standard to other situations. But I came to have
increasing doubts about the soundness of the Court's
approach and about some of the assumptions
underlying it. I could not join the plurality opinion in
Rosen loom, and 1 dissented in Gertz, asserting that
the common-law remedies should be retained for
private plaintiffs.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
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is not a novel concept, for this theme recurs in the decisions
discussed above from Thornhill to New York Times and to the
present.51 Subscribers to this idea believe that the dissemination
and sharing of speech relating to political matters is so
fundamentally central to democratic self-government that no other
type of speech should supersede it in a hierarchy of values. This
desire to protect speech of a political nature has led some to take
the concept to its extreme; that is, to limit constitutional protection
only to speech that 'concerned with governmental behavior, policy
or personnel."' Most readily ascribed to Judge Robert Bork," such
an approach would solve the obvious problem of differentiating
speech on "matters of public concern" from that on purely private
matters by limiting the former to a very narrow and more easily
defined sub-category of political speech.
This proposed limitation of First Amendment protection to
explicitly political speech, and even the more temperate "public
concern" doctrine as it now exists, finds disfavor with a great
number of scholars. Before Connick gave expression related to
public affairs a more protected status, speech was grouped into two
categories: speech afforded full First Amendment protection, and
speech that for various reasons was precluded from receiving such
protection.', The default level of protection could be described as
59. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("Those who won
our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning
and communication of ideas to discover and spread political... truth."): New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("[Mlaintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion ... is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.") (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931)); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491. U.S. 657.
687 (1989) ("Vigorous reportage of political campaigns is necessary for the
optimal functioning of democratic institutions and central to our history of
individual liberty.").
60. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971). Bork has since repudiated his support
of such narrow tailoring. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 44.
61. See Post, supra note 8, at 671.
62. Fred Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 281 (1981) (discussing lesser First Amendment
protection afforded to various categories of expression such as obscenity and
commercial speech).
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"full," with content-based categories such as commercial speech or
obscenity excluded from that protection's ambit. Professor Fred
Schauer deems this pre-Connick regime a "defining out" approach;
that is, speech was presumed to be fully protected unless it was
excluded or "defined-out" from that broad categorization. By
contrast, the current "public concern" and "newsworthiness"
regimes represent a "defining-in" approach, in which full
constitutional protection is granted only to speech that is identified
as "newsworthy" or a "matter of public concern."64
This "defining-in" framework raises two noteworthy
problems. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the "defining"
itself, which has been discussed herein in the examination of the
"matters of public concern" and "newsworthiness" doctrines and
will be further undertaken infra. The second problem with
"defining-in" protected speech is a more general worry that limiting
default-level First Amendment protection to only certain types of
speech amounts to abrogating the Constitution itself. This is an
endemic fear, not only for scholars but also for the very Justices
who have authored (and, of course, dissented from) the opinions
legitimizing such an approach. Professor Robert Post writes that
"defining-in" speech to be granted the utmost constitutional respect
subverts the very self-government rationale that the defining-in
approach purports to serve.
Where full First Amendment protection is afforded only to
speech that is defined-in to the "public concern" category, it is
inevitable (due to the inherent vagueness of the "public concern"
test) that some speech not explicitly political-yet still beneficial to
the public discourse and the overall aim of efficient and just self-
government-will not be "defined-in." ''  For example, discourse
regarding such issues as the role of motherhood, the meaning of
American citizenshipj'7 or even tales of everyday, private citizens
63. Id. at 280-81.
64. Id. at 279-80.
65. Post. supra note 8, at 671.
66. Jd.
67. [d. Post offers these two examples of important issues that are not
expressly political and thus might be excluded from a "defined in" concept of
"public concern."
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who have faced down problems and emerged triumphant would not
be deemed overtly central to the democratic political process.
Speech on all of these topics would be excluded from the highest
level of First Amendment protection by a rule like the one Judge
Bork once suggested. Nonetheless, all are instructive to those who
might read or see or hear them; people who, by exposure to such
stories, may make more informed decisions about the society in
which they live and the roles they wish to play in that society.
2. The Failures of the "Public Concern" and "Newsworthiness"
Tests
Judicial opinions in cases ranging from employment rights
to defamation to public disclosure of private facts reveal that
defining what is a "matter of public concern" or "newsworthy" is
quite nearly a losing proposition from the start. Some of the finest
legal minds in the nation have undertaken the task, and the fact
that so many other fine minds have disparaged the results is but
some of the proof that they have failed. This is not an aspersion
upon their capabilities but a reflection of the extreme difficulty
inherent in separating that which "concerns the public" from that
which does not. In a dissent from one of the Court's obscenity
decisions, Justice Brennan offered the following lamentation, which
just as readily could have pertained to the -public concern"
doctrine:
[A]fter [sixteen] years of experimentation and
debate I am reluctantly forced to the
conclusion that none of the available
formulas... can reduce the vagueness to a
tolerable level .... Any effort to draw a
constitutionally acceptable boundary on state
power must resort to such indefinite concepts
[that the] meaning of these concepts necessarily
varies with the experience, outlook, and even
idiosyncrasies of the person defining them./>
68. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J..,
dissenting).
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What, then, is the alternative? Are these concepts in media
law destined to suffer from inconsistency and vagueness, left to
define "matters of public concern" by Justice Stewart's famous
obscenity standard of "I know it when I see it"?" Unfortunately,
that appears to be the standard to which efforts to define "matters
of public concern" and "newsworthiness" have been reduced-an
ad hoc undertaking in which the definition fluctuates according to
the "experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies" of the decision-
maker.
Professor Robert Post maintains that the vagueness of the
various incarnations of "public concern" and "newsworthiness"
tests is a direct result of the difficulty in defining the terms
themselves. Post writes that "public concern" can take on one of
two distinct meanings. The first of these meanings, which he terms
the "normative" conception of "public concern," relates to speech
on issues directly pertinent to democratic self-government. There
is a clear parallel between this "normative" conception and the
category of speech that Judge Bork and others have wished to see
as the only category granted full protection by the First
Amendment. Post asserts that it is this "normative" conception of
"public concern" that underlies most of the existing jurisprudence;
it explains the New York Times distinction between public officials
and others and serves as the starting point for various judicial
opinions lauding speech integral to the democratic process. In
outlining the "normative" approach, Post points out that under this
conception of "public concern," fully protected speech is fairly easy
to identify.74 Indeed, were it the only category of speech to be
protected, as Bork once suggested, the doctrine of "public concern"
would be much simpler but also much closer to an abomination of
constitutional proportions. In "defining-in" only that which is
explicitly political, ancillary issues that are nonetheless valuable to
69. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184. 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Post. supra note 8, at 668-69.
71. Id. at 669.
72. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
73. Post, supra note 8. at 669-70.
74. Id. at 670.
75. Id. at 670-71.
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the art of self-government are excluded from protection.
Post's second conception of "public concern" illuminates
the obvious flaws within the regime. The "descriptive" conception
of "public concern" relates to speech that is "public" in an
empirical sense; quite literally, this category of speech is public
because the public already knows about it. Lest this be deemed an
oversimplification, Post cites cases in which speech has been
deemed to implicate "matters of public concern" based upon
statistical surveys indicating interest by a "significant number of
persons. While this conception may actually prove "more
democratic" by allowing for the full protection of speech where the
collective public displays an interest, it too raises serious questions.
This conception leaves relevant definitions vulnerable not only to
the "idiosyncrasies" of which Justice Brennan warned but also to
76. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. To illustrate this
principle, Post uses the alleged impetus behind Warren and Brandeis' famous
law review article. The Right to Privacy. He maintains that Warren in
particular sought to remove constitutional protection from speech regarding
private matters because, as an elite Bostonian, he was aghast at newspaper
accounts of his various dalliances. Post writes that while on the surface these
accounts may have appeared entirely "private," they in fact implicated very
serious issues such as class inequities, the redistribution of wealth via the
income tax, and the introduction of the welfare state. By removing this type
of speech from the ambit of protection, it quelled an avenue of public
discourse on these important subjects. Post, supra note 8, at 671-72 (citing
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890)).
77. Post, supra note 8, at 669.
78. Id. at 672-73 (citing the following cases as examples: Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Harris v. Tomczak. 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Cal.
1982)). This approach was anticipated but not endorsed in 1971 by Justice
Marshall. who wrote:
[A]ssuming that under the rule announced [in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia] courts are not simply to
take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion of'
the population is" interested or concerned in a subject,
courts will be required to somehow pass on the
legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject:
what information is relevant to self-government.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
media-driven information cascades.
The foremost problem with the "descriptive" conception of
"public concern" is that by "defining-in" issues for which there is
merely quantitative evidence of popularity, full First Amendment
protection may be extended to matters that appeal only to morbid
interests or sensationalism. In today's Information Age, there are
billions around the world interested in the prurient details of
celebrities' extra-marital affairs and other such trivialities."' While
one might hope that the guidance offered in cases such as Diaz-
that matters such as these are not to be deemed "newsworthy"-
would be followed, some recent jurisprudence quashes that hope."
To place such mere titillations on par with political speech would
border on the perverse. Yet truth be told, political apathy and
modern celebrity culture might lead such stories to garner more
• 82
interest than an ongoing campaign for President. The descriptive
approach, like the normative approach, creates the same risks
associated with any "defining-in" categorization of speech. A
"defining-in" regime that is based on a quantitative measure of
public appeal will inevitably exclude from full First Amendment
protection as-of-yet unpublicized stories that would nonetheless be
79. Id. at 673.
80. While this Article was in progress, rumored affairs of one of the
world's most famous athletes, British soccer star David Beckham, were behind
what can only be described as a media frenzy. An April 2004 Googe News
search of the footballer's name turned up an amazing 6310 hits (nearly as
many as Vice President Dick Cheney); nearly all related to his alleged marital
infidelity.
81. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm't Grp.. Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a television tabloid story on a stolen Pamela
Anderson sex video was protected as regarding a matter of "legitimate public
concern" because of Anderson's status as a "sex symbol").
82. This trend was illustrated by the public outcry that resulted when an
episode of American Idol was preempted by a Presidential press conference
regarding the status of the war in Iraq. The Fox Network, which broadcasts
American Idol, publicly debated whether to air the talent show or the press
conference, at one point actually deciding to air Idol with a running crawl at
the screen bottom summarizing the happenings of President Bush's answers.
See Sarah Rodman, Bush Comes to Shove for "American Idol" Tonight.,
BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 13, 2004, at 3.
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valuable to self-governance. 3
The latter concern anticipates the impact that information
cascades may exert on the legal definitions of "newsworthiness"
and "matters of public concern." While an analysis of media
influence will be undertaken in Part III infra, suffice it to say that
leaving the definition of "public concern" to rest upon empirical
measures of public interest invites a regime of media agenda-setting
that threatens free and honest public discourse. If non-political
speech receives full constitutional protection only when it finds the
most favor with the public,4 the very purpose of the First
Amendment's free speech clause is in jeopardy.
II. INFORMATION CASCADES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
As 2003 turned into 2004, John Kerry's campaign for
president was in shambles. A wealthy and visible senator who had
been a favorite of the liberal establishment since his anti-war
activism of the early 1970s, Kerry had once been the prohibitive
front-runner in the race to challenge President George W. Bush.
But along the way his run met hurdles. Kerry was temporarily
weakened by the scare of prostate cancer, and more permanently
dogged by accusations that he was too haughty and aloof to connect
with the voters who determine the early Democratic primaries.
Much, if not all, of Kerry's momentum had been assumed by
Vermont Governor Howard Dean, a candidate from literally out of
nowhere who had begun to take on the air of inevitability as
presumptive nominee-before a single primary vote had been cast.
In late December, Kerry found himself trailing Dean by thirty
points in the polls, and was forced to take out a mortgage on his
wife's Boston home in order to fund his campaign in the face of
dwindling financial support."
83. Post. supra note 8, at 673.
84. The explicitly political, by any reasonable definition, will always
enjoy the utmost protection. As has been shown to this point, the real concern
is over the protection afforded those issues that on their face might not appear
to implicate self-government, but that in fact are indispensable to the public
dialogue.
85. This entire account, while repeated ad nauseum in the media for
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Less than a month later, Kerry had, for all intents and
purposes, locked up the nomination. How could this have
happened? To be sure, a few strategic initiatives helped Kerry's
cause. He outspent his rivals in the first primary (caucus, as it
were) state, Iowa, thus raising his profile among undecided voters.
He also began to emphasize his record as a war veteran, appealing
to Midwestern sensibilities and the perceived need for a president,
post-9/l1, with a strong foreign policy background. "" However, exit
polls revealed that one factor in particular attracted Iowa voters to
Kerry and eventually led him to victory: they voted for him because
he was "electable. '" 7
How, one might ask, could someone's "electability" come
into play when not a single vote had yet been cast? After all, one is
"electable" by definition if he is likely to receive votes, and one
receives votes based on a litany of professional and personal
characteristics -experience, integrity, magnetism, etc. -that
belonged (or didn't belong) just as much to the polling-in-single-
digits Kerry as they did to nominee Kerry. Something else was
obviously in play, and that something was a textbook example of an
information cascade.
Kerry's campaign, aided by a Democratic establishment
worried about selecting Governor Dean as its standard-bearer, had
begun to accentuate the perception that Dean would not fare well
in a general election contest against President Bush. Kerry himself
began to introduce the idea that primary voters should vote for him
precisely because more people would vote for him. Voters who
may have been uninitiated with respect to the candidates' actual
qualities took to this idea-based in large part on its growing
prominence as a news item-and apparently decided that they
nearly two months, is recounted nicely in Douglas Waller, How .ohn Kerry
Won Iowa, TIME (Online Ed.), at
www.time.com/time/clection2004/article/0,18471,579103,00.html (Jan. 20.
2004).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., William Saletan, Kerried Away: The Myth and Math of
Kerry's Electability, SLATE MAG., at http://slate.msn.com/id/2095311/ (Feb. 10,
2004) (noting that "[i]f people support Kerry because they think he's
electable, he goes up in the polls. which makes him look more electable").
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should vote for Kerry because other people would as well." In
essence, the only change in Kerry's strategy was to suggest that
people would vote for him if other people voted for him. By the
weekend before the caucus, Kerry caught Dean in the polls. Kerry
wound up receiving twice as many votes as Dean, a victory that
eventually propelled him to the Democratic nomination, explicitly
by virtue of the fact that voters thought that other voters would
pick Kerry as their candidate."
Defined as a "self-reinforcing process of collective belief
formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain
reaction that gives the perception of increasing plausibility through
its rising availability in public discourse," the information cascade
has long been studied in the fields of economics and social science.
Economists wished to examine the impact of these cascades on
stock prices, which of course are dependent on what others are
willing to pay for a share of a public corporation. Social and
political scientists (and political operatives), as illustrated in the
Kerry example, have tied voting patterns to this form of collective
belief formation. There is scant literature however, regarding the
role played by mass media in furthering information cascades. No
study has detailed the potential link between cascades and certain
aspects of the "public concern" and "newsworthiness" doctrines. In
order to undertake that examination, it is necessary to further
explore the theory underlying the very concept of information
cascades themselves.
Simply put, information cascades result when those who are
charged with making a decision lack information. Far from being
irrational or whimsical, the genesis and proliferation of such a
88. It should of course be noted that Governor Dean's meteoric rise and
just-as-dramatic fall were both also prime examples of information cascades.
The public really knew nothing about the man other than that other people
were beginning to jump on (and then off) his bandwagon. Dean kept doing the
same thing he had done for nearly two years on the trail. Yet once the "Dean
can't be elected" ball began rolling, it was impossible to stop.
89. Waller, supra note 85. Those voters who based their selection on the
criteria other than "electability" -such as "agrees with you on issues" -almost
unanimously picked someone other than Kerry. See Saletan, supra note 87
(discussing the first 14 democratic primaries).
90. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 683.
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cascade is based on the rational choice of decision-makers to act as
free-riders upon the informational disposition already attained by
others." Decision-makers, confronted with either inability or
unwillingness to accumulate information sufficient to make an
informed choice on a matter, instead rely upon the revealed choices
of others to formulate opinions. Some scholars maintain that the
simpler a decision is to make, the more likely an information
cascade is to occur. More abstract ideas (economists often cite
financial decisions of heightened complexity) do not lend
themselves so readily to the process."
Information cascades are closely linked with concepts such
as game theory and heuristics in that they are premised on the
propensity of rational actors to make behavioral decisions
contingent upon the actions of others. 4 Information cascades need
not be seen in a pejorative light; in theory, if the decision made at
the ground-floor of the cascade is "right," then a strict adherence by
those later in the process may actually prove beneficial. So too can
cascades serve as an efficient use of resources on the part of a
decision-maker who wishes not to incur the costs, real and
transactional, of personally gathering enough cogent information
on which to base a decision.
That said, the potentially harmful effects of information
cascades are not difficult to identify. To begin, most would agree
that a more personally well-informed public is socially desirable. A
decision-making populace that takes its cues solely from the actions
of a few (typically elite) actors strays quickly from democracy to
paternalistic oligarchy-a societal condition even further
illegitimized if those decision-making elites are un-elected. Where
a cascade has developed to the point that its veracity is essentially
91. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Role of Law in Managing Market Moods:
The Whole Story of Jason, Who Bought High, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 119
(2000) (reviewing ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL ExUBERANCE (2000)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 119-20.
94. Professor Cass Sunstein, perhaps the legal academy's foremost
authority on matters of cascades and heuristics, posits that much of what
informs the propensity to make decisions based on the cues of others is an
endemic human aversion to undertaking cost-benefit analyses. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 tJ. CHI. L. REV. 751, 778-79 (2003).
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unquestioned by the decision-making public, the accumulation of
relevant information may altogether cease while the cascade
continues to promulgate itself as a result of a "herd" mentality]P
The unfortunate result can be the virtual institutionalization of a
bad idea with nobody left to question it via newly obtained
information. As one commentator succinctly stated, "[i]f
information flows freely, it is as possible that bad policy choices will
spread as [will] good policy choices. There is a [sic] substantial
literature on 'information cascades' that demonstrates that the
contagion process often overwhelms the quality of an idea.'
Another notable feature is the virtual impossibility of predicting an
informational cascade in an effort to protect against potential
deleterious outcomes.9 Economists have noted this feature since
the phenomenon was first described-someone who could predict a
cascade with respect to a stock could make himself an incredibly
wealthy person."
For better or for worse, the results of an information
cascade can be dramatic. If enough people decide to halt their
pursuit of relevant and independently obtained information, their
reliance on the choices of others can replicate behavior on a mass
scale. Even a small-scale decision made at the starting point of a
cascade can multiply through dissemination to the masses and
effectuate large-scale behavior changes at the cascade's "end.""
One example of this cascade-driven amplification offered by a
number of scholars is related to box-office receipts for movies; the
95. Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 tJ. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1045-
46 (2003).
96. David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schdnberger, Governing Networks:
Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe antd the United States, 27 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 819, 837 (2002).
97. John Cassidy, Chaos in Hollywood: Can Science Explain Why a
Movie is a Hit or a Flop?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 1997, at 36-37.
98. Cf. Gabaldon, supra note 91, at 119 (describing the potential effects
of a market-related information cascade as follows: "if investors respond to
their possession of limited information by watching other investors, who in
turn are watching other investors, a great deal of activity can be triggered by
the decisions of a very few.").
99. Daniel Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not
Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1018 n.68 (1998).
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only reliable indicator of how much money a movie will make is
how much it made the week before, and the difference of a few
million dollars on an opening weekend can end up making a
difference of tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in total
profits. CU
111. INFORMATION CASCADES AND MASS MEDIA LAW
The role of mass media in creating and furthering
information cascades has been both understudied and
underestimated. This role has increased exponentially with the
creation and popularization of the Internet. It is almost certainly
the case that the anonymous, impersonal nature of the Internet
permits promulgation of information cascades that would have
been impossible before its introduction. Internet media are also
prone to cascade-creation because of the prevalence and speed of
email discussion lists, news postings, websites, and other Internet
protocols."" Information cascades born and fueled in cyberspace
are also among the most "pure" examples of the phenomenon
because the decision is being disseminated in an anonymous
100. Cassidy, supra note 97, at 37. Information cascades have also been
used to explain aspects of the American judicial system. Scholars are split as
to whether the cascade phenomenon can explain the reliance on precedent
that characterizes our system of common law. Some would answer in the
affirmative, citing information cascades and a sociological analog, path
dependency, as the root principle underlying judicial stare decisis. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 638 (2003) (terming the
association between common law formation and information cascades
"persuasive"). Others dismiss such an association, arguing that the wealth of
information available to an opinion-writing judge makes the likelihood of a
negative informational cascade promulgating itself in anything approaching
perpetuity quite low. Cf. Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 92 (1999) (arguing that although it is "possible for
precedent to manifest some cascade-like characteristics, the necessary
conditions for such phenomena to occur appear somewhat implausible. in
particular, .. . practices within the judiciary-such as long judicial tenures.,
written opinions, and the hierarchical appeals processes-tend to reduce the
likelihood of a 'bad' precedential cascade.").
101. See CASS SUNSTEIN. REPUBL1C.CoM 80-84 (2001).
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fashion.
Thus, while the Information Age has the capability of
reducing the necessity and employ of information cascades by
providing decision-makers with less expensive and more readily
available information, the paradoxical effect may actually be
proliferation of cascades. This may prove particularly harmful due
to the general lack of norms and ethics governing Internet (quasi-)
journalism. It is true that even mainstream media have come under
attack of late due to scandals rooted in bias and fabrication, but the
generally accepted canon of professional journalistic ethics is
largely absent in cyberspace.
Mainstream media connect information cascades to the
"public concern" doctrine. Nearly all of the seminal defamation
and privacy cases have arisen in the mass media context, and thus
the relationship between traditional media and the pertinent legal
regimes is relatively clear. It is, in fact, the existence of a mass
media apparatus that gives rise to a collective "public" that may (or
may not) be "concerned" with a given subject-matter or issue.
Without such channels of mass information dissemination, both
information cascades and "matters of public concern" would be
limited in scope to personal interactions and word-of-mouth. Print,
radio, and television media make widespread belief formation
possible. As Professor Post describes it:
Widely distributed speech itself becomes a
shared stimulus of the kind necessary for the
creation of public discourse; thus the
"emergence of the mass media and of the
'public' are mutually constructive
developments." If speech about well-known
matters deepens public experience, widely
distributed speech makes even heretofore
secret matters well-known and thus extends the
range of public experience."t°
The power of media to further an agenda can be-and has
been-used in manners both benevolent and self-serving. Whether
102. Post, supra note 8, at 677 (quoting A. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC
OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY 95 (1976)).
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or not a topic is, of its own accord, ("normatively") a "matter of
public concern," a rational media actor will necessarily promote
and further coverage of stories that appeal most to the public (are
of "descriptive" public concern). In addition, the recent media
tendency is not only to cover a story, but to also "cover the
coverage" of the story. Particularly prevalent in coverage of
criminal trials and political races, the media themselves becomes
the primary focus, with other media actors commenting upon the
quality, veracity, and (most often) frequency of coverage of a given
event. ' 3 The result can be, ostensibly, a furtherance of the very
interest that the story purportedly seeks to condemn; for example, a
story bemoaning the "horse-race" coverage of a political race likely
does nothing more than increase public interest in that aspect of the
electoral campaign. When combined with the innovation of the
twenty-four hour cable news cycle, the potential for the mass
repetition of issues both "normatively" worthy and unworthy of
public interest is great indeed.
Mass media are not merely procedurally prone to the
genesis of informational cascades. They are also inherently
susceptible to a "herd mentality" with regard to substantive
coverage. This tendency is manifest most clearly (and famously) in
the political realm. This Article opened with a contrast between
media treatment of the sexual escapades of President Kennedy and
that of his successor some thirty years later, Bill Clinton. Two
possible explanations for this discrepancy relate to the media's role
in the Watergate scandal of another president, Richard Nixon.
First, the media establishment became more wary, as did the public,
of any and all governmental action due to the perceived
mishandling of the war in Vietnam and the malfeasance of the
Nixon administration during Watergate. This distrust led the media
to focus with renewed fervor on their role as "watchdogs" of
democracy; willing and ready to uncover the misdeeds of
government actors.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the coverage of the
103. An explicit example of this phenomenon is the weekly Fox News
program Fox News Watch, in which columnists and pundits review the media's
performance for the preceding week.
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Watergate scandal sold papers-and made two reporters into
celebrity journalists, subjects of a motion picture, and eventually
household names. It is only natural that this factored in to the
frenzied coverage of the Clinton scandal; once the story broke (on
the Internet, notably, by Matt Drudge),0 4 no outlet or reporter
would be outdone in its (or his) coverage. The echo chamber of
sorts led naturally to a cascade of epic proportions, and not
necessarily a negative one-citizens should be kept apprised of the
actions of their elected officials. The difference between the
treatment of Kennedy and Clinton does evidence an extremely
increased vulnerability to cascades over thirty years, due in large
part to the increased vigilance, self-interest, and visibility of mass
media. All of these factors contribute to the complex relationship
between information cascades and the legal concept of "public
concern."
IV. CONCLUSION
Information cascades significantly influence the attention
paid by the public to a given issue. Furthermore, it is clear that
media play an important and even indispensable role in sustaining
the life of an information cascade, by virtue of its ability to
continually disseminate the already-formulated viewpoints of
others to those who lack information. What is easy to lose in this
syllogism of sorts-but crucial to an examination of the media's role
in fashioning "public concern"-is that the very fact that a story is
being publicized furthers the information cascade. The public's
concern with a given topic is in reality a function of the amount of
attention it is paid in the various media. As such, it is possible that
media themselves can act as standard-setters in a regime where
104. For a concise yet comprehensive background of Matt Drudge's
website, The Drudge Report, (www.drudgereport.com) see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drudge-Report (last visited February 8, 2005).
Ironically enough, most such primers on Drudge are not complete without
references to the libel suit brought against him by Clinton aide Sidney
Blumenthal, a case that turned explicitly on the very First Amendment issues
that are the focus of this Article. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.C. 1998).
330 FIRS T AMENDMENT LA W REVIE W [Vol. 3
quantitative publicity equals legal protection. ""
The standard's inherent vulnerability to manipulation-
conscious or unconscious, benevolent or self-interested-is all but
absent where the speech at issue is explicitly political or
normatively "of public concern." The ideal of free-flowing political
speech is so rightly engrained into the American self-government
experiment that anything approaching the abrogation of such would
be viewed as an abomination.'"' This sentiment is reflected in the
law governing defamation and public disclosure of private facts, and
is almost always manifest in judicial opinions that implicate the
First Amendment.' °7 Thus, as instructive as a discussion of the
Clinton scandal and the media's coverage thereof may be to an
understanding of the media's role in information cascades, such
explicitly political speech is not at all threatened by the vagueness
and ineffectiveness of the current regime.
The media's roles as catalysts and ongoing propagators of
information cascades is important for First Amendment purposes
with respect to: (1) Dun & Bradstreet-style private plaintiffs in
defamation actions and (2) plaintiffs bringing causes of action for
public disclosure of private facts. These are the causes of action
wherein definitions of "matters of public concern" and
"newsworthiness" are nearly dispositive to the success of a claim.
Furthermore, they are the arenas in which the definitions of these
terms are most ill-formed and open to ad hoc subjectivity. The
absence of concrete guidelines permits courts to employ
"descriptive" concepts of "public concern," in which case the
deciding factor in deeming an issue "of public concern" may often
105. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
106. One need only observe the visceral reaction of scholars and citizens
alike to the Alien and Sedition Acts to fully grasp this concept. See, e.g., JOHN
C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACIS (1951).
107. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)
("[M]aintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion ... is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.") (quoting Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88. 95
(1940) ("Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of
free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread
political.. . truth."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("public discussion is a political duty").
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be the amount of news coverage it has received. This, obviously,
creates a perverse incentive for news organizations to reveal and
repeat defamatory comments and private facts, in hopes that by
doing so they will ignite public interest and thereby earn the
heightened protection afforded to speech on matters of "public
concern."108 Thus, solely by virtue of the media's use of information
cascades, a seemingly private matter may be elevated to an issue of
"public concern" both practically and legally.
The primary goal of the current legal regime and any
attempts to refine or replace it is to locate an equitable medium
between competing interests. On one end of this metaphorical
spectrum is freedom of expression, protected by the First
Amendment as perhaps the most cherished of all American
freedoms and philosophically the source from which all of our other
freedoms emanate. At the other end of this spectrum is the right to
privacy and dominion over one's personal life, a right protected by
the causes of action discussed to this point, neither of which is
frivolous or without worth. The challenge of reconciling these
competing interests is at the core of the examination of the "public
concern" doctrine, and is made all the more difficult by the
phenomenon of information cascades and the influence they can
and do exert upon an already quite convoluted regime. Media-
driven cascades also impact another balance that must be struck-
this one between allowing for a legitimate and open public debate
on matters only implicitly relevant to self-government, while
protecting the privacy of actors involved in issues which may be
"public" only by virtue of the self-interest of media in making them
so. How, then, to improve upon the current state of jurisprudential
affairs?
One suggestion has been to afford speech potentially
inviting the "public concern" and "newsworthiness" tests the same
"defining-out" presumption of validity as prevails in nearly every
other category of free speech jurisprudence.""V In this view, merely
requiring plaintiffs to bear the burden of showing a lack of
108. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
109. Estlund, suipra note 11, at 41.
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"newsworthiness" is not enough;1' courts should start with the
presumption that all speech is fully protected, and then exclude (by
"defining-out") speech that should not be afforded full protection.
Because "we can avoid more errors of under-inclusion by defining
out rather than defining in," this standard would create a broader
category of protected expression that a speaker would have to
exceed (or "get out of") to lose protection, as opposed to the
current framework of "getting in" (via finding "public concern" or
"newsworthiness") to gain protection. Although this proposal has
merit, such a system would still lend itself to the vagueness and ad
hoc definition fashioning that plagues the current regime, and
would change little more than the semantics of jury instructions and
black-letter law.
Entirely more pessimistic but more rooted in practicality are
the views of those like Professor Post, who see little chance of even
theoretical reconciliation between the two competing interests in
the defamation and public disclosure realms.' 3 Even a practical
overhaul of the legal regimes cannot be accomplished in a neutral
fashion;3 4 any new system would, depending on circumstances,
favor one or the other of the interests at stake, as is the case now
with any court's determination of a matter as public or private,
"newsworthy" or sensationalistic. So too would any potential
revision be open to the realities of information cascades and the
role of media in such-this influence became inescapable the
instant the mass media became "mass" in scale. Ironically enough,
the best way to combat these inherent problems is simply to allow
for and encourage an open dialogue on their existence, creating, in
essence, an information cascade regarding the prevalence of
information cascades. The search for an appropriate balance
110. In a claim for public disclosure of private facts, the plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the defendant publicized information about the plaintiff's
private life; (2) disclosure of that information "would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person," and- (3) the information disclosed "is lot of legitimate
concern to the public." RESTArIEMENI (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)
(emphasis added).
111. Id. (quoting Schauer, supra note 62, at 281).
112. Id.
113. Post, supra note 8, at 684.
114. id.
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between First Amendment freedoms and the privacy rights
protected by publication torts must be informed by an appreciation
for the prevalence and power of information cascades. Predictably,
the interests of society and its citizens will be best served when
people can make informed decisions based upon the free exchange
of ideas.
